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Daniel Markovits* THREE ISSUES IN LEGAL ETHICS
A court – which is the name given the institution charged with resolving legal dis-
putes at retail – is comprised of three elements: an umpire ( judge or jury), disputants,
and advocates. The court’s structural purpose is legitimate (which is not the same
thing as just) dispute resolution. No part of the court can stand in for the whole;
each is only a part. In order for the court to achieve legitimacy, each of its components
must pursue partial aims: the umpire must seek truth and justice, the parties must be
free to seek advantage, and lawyers must pursue partisan loyalty.
Lawyerly partisanship thus stands against truth and justice – the court’s legiti-
macy requires this. Although rules of legal ethics might constrain hyper-zeal, the legiti-
macy of the court requires that lawyers’ ethics avoid imposing general duties to truth
and justice as this would conflate advocate and umpire. This requirement of legitima-
tion is a direct consequence of the familiar fact of moral pluralism. There simply exist
no regulative principles – including principles of justice – on which all sides of moral
and political disputes can agree. Legitimacy depends on affective engagement with a
process; it cannot be sustained by argument. Adjudication is part of this process; and
adjudication requires partisan lawyers.
Partisanship is thus ineliminable from the lawyer’s life. Legal ethics must take such
partisanship into account. To do so, it must take up problems associated with the
lawyer’s integrity. Such questions are not mere navel-gazing but are instead entirely
appropriate for a profession whose place in the political division of labour renders con-
flicts between professional obligations and ordinary moral ambitions particularly
clear and stark.
Legal ethics thus cannot – for reasons that apply to ethics quite generally – ever be
reduced to generic moral or political theory. And in this sense, taking the lawyer’s
point of view in legal ethics is not a sop to local interest but an inevitable part of
any serious engagement with the legal facts and moral circumstances of the
lawyer’s life.
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I Introduction
I am grateful for Alice Woolley’s detailed and attentive engagement with
some of my (and Tim Dare’s) ideas concerning legal ethics and also to
the editors of the University of Toronto Law Journal for publishing
Woolley’s work and permitting me this reply. A friend once described
the week preceding the publication of a book as ‘the calm before . . .
the calm.’ I am delighted that at least some people have noticed A
Modern Legal Ethics and cared to respond. I hope that this reply will
return the favour.
* Yale Law School, Yale University
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Before I take up Woolley’s essay substantively and in earnest, I would
like briefly to note that, at least on my reading of the book, I do not
say some of the things that she attributes to me. Certainly, I do not
believe them. It is always tempting to take back out of one’s mouth
words that others have put in. And I am, accordingly, inclined to docu-
ment in detail the particular differences between the actual argument
of A Modern Legal Ethics and the account of the argument that appears
in Woolley’s essay. But what I have written, and doubly-so what
I believe, is a subject more interesting to me than to others. Therefore,
yielding to this temptation will not produce a useful, nor perhaps even
a readable, exchange.
A better course of action is to identify some key issues that arise out of
Woolley’s essay and to address them in terms of the book’s argument.
This is what I shall try to do below. At the same time, and for the
record, I would like, nevertheless, to say generally that Woolley’s
summary seems to me in important respects to misreport my views.
With this preliminary out of the way, it is time to get down to business.
Woolley’s essay raises at least three important issues, which turn out to be
related. I shall take up each in turn, drawing out the relations among
them as I go along and then putting them together in a brief conclusion.
II The lawyerly vices
First, Woolley questions just how far the lawyer’s professional obligations –
as they appear in the positive law – depart from ordinary morality. I claim
that lawyers come under professional obligations to display certain
characteristically lawyerly vices – to lie and to cheat.1 Woolley reminds
readers that, in addition to the rules concerning loyalty and zeal that
underwrite these vices, the positive law also contains rules that constrain
lawyerly partisanship and, indeed, make lawyers officers of the court.2
Woolley admits that my account of the lawyerly vices acknowledges
these constraints, but she insists that I do not acknowledge them in the
right way. Thus, she claims that I ‘fail[] to recognize that the features
of the law governing lawyers that [limit lawyerly partisanship] . . . are
not simply qualifications on other things; they are additional and inde-
pendent legal obligations with which the lawyer must comply.’3 Insofar
as I fail to give proper weight to the parts of legal ethics that require
lawyers to deal honestly and fairly, Woolley claims, I mischaracterize the
1 See generally, Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary Advocacy in a Democratic
Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) at 44–78 [Markovits].
2 See Alice Woolley ‘If Philosophical Legal Ethics Is the Answer, What Is the Question?’
(2010) 60 U.T.L.J. 983 at 991 [this issue] [Woolley].
3 See ibid. at 991.
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lawyer’s role and hence her distinctive role ethics. More specifically, I
attribute to lawyers duties of ‘hyper-zeal,’4 whereas lawyers, in fact, have
professional obligations to display only ordinary zeal. Although Woolley
never quite comes out and says so (and, in fact, says something quite
different, which I will take up directly in a moment), I suspect that she
thinks this distinction important because mere ordinary zeal does not
generate the tensions with conventional first-personal ethics on which
my argument concerning lawyerly integrity depends.
I agree with Woolley that lawyers – both under the positive law as it
stands in the United States today and certainly under any number of par-
tisanship-limiting reforms that would, nevertheless, retain the distinctively
adversary character of the lawyer’s role – must display only ordinary and
not ‘hyper’ zeal. In fact, I spend nearly fifty pages of A Modern Legal Ethics
identifying and cataloguing the rules that limit lawyerly partisanship.5
I argue there, in substantial doctrinal detail, that the versions of these
constraining rules in place in the United States today do not sufficiently
constrain lawyerly partisanship to bring the lawyer’s professional obli-
gations into line with ordinary morality. There is no point in rehearsing
this detailed argument here. It may be wrong, of course. But I believe
it to be right, and Woolley has not answered or, indeed, addressed it in
the kind of detail that would be needed to put a dent in this belief.
Rather, Woolley has (entirely properly) responded at a higher level of
abstraction, asserting that the general principle that lawyers are officers
of the court sufficiently ties lawyers’ professional conduct to ordinary
morality to undermine my claim that ordinary morality characterizes
this conduct as vicious.6 To answer Woolley’s charge that I have mischar-
acterized the lawyer’s professional role, I must refute her assertion. The
required refutation should proceed at the same level of abstraction as
that of Woolley’s claim. I return, therefore, to the structural character
of the lawyer’s role – to its place in the division of labour between advo-
cate and tribunal.
While lawyers act as partisan advocates, the tribunals before which they
appear – including through the efforts of both judges and juries –
pursue truth and justice. This correct perception enables Woolley to
4 See ibid. at 992.
5 Thus, although Chapter 2 of A Modern Legal Ethics defends the claims that lawyers have
professional obligations to lie and to cheat, most of the chapters’ pages are devoted to
identifying the constraints on lying and cheating that lawyers face and to explaining
why these constraints do not solve the problem of the lawyer’s underlying obligations
to manifest professional vices in her actions. In addition, much of Chapter 3 of the
book is similarly devoted to identifying further constraints on lawyers’ partisanship
and arguing that these, also, do not render lawyers obligations compatible with
ordinary first-personal morality.
6 See Woolley, supra note 2 at 991.
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suggest that lawyers’ obligations to support the operations of these tribu-
nals – captured by the idea that they are officers of the court – suffi-
ciently connect them to truth and justice so as eliminate the tensions
between their professional obligations and ordinary morality or, at least,
to reduce these tensions to tolerable levels. If lawyers are officers of an
institution that pursues truth and justice, then surely they cannot be
required to lie and to cheat in the manner that I describe.
This simple and appealing argument rests on a confusion, however. In
particular, it conflates judge and jury, whom I shall together call the umpire,
with the broader structure of adjudication within which they act. The court
is constituted by this broader structure, which includes not just the umpire
but also the parties and their advocates. (Woolley implicitly accepts this
when she characterizes the lawyers’ duties as officers of the court in
terms of a duty to ‘maintain[] the process of the adversarial system,’7 but
she does not draw the appropriate conclusions.) The umpire, to be sure,
pursues truth and justice. But the umpire is but a part of the court, and
the court writ large pursues, not truth and justice, but something very
different, namely legitimacy in the face of ongoing and intractable disputes
about what truth and justice require. The court, that is, constitutes a system
of dispute resolution that aims to generate agreement about which resol-
utions of disputes to obey in the face of disagreement about which resol-
utions to adopt: it aims to generate agreement, moreover, without
resolving the disagreement, which the system treats as entrenched. One
might even say that the court aims to achieve legitimacy without producing
justice. The eighth chapter of A Modern Legal Ethics, entitled ‘Lawyerly
Fidelity and Political Legitimacy,’8 explains this aim and locates it within
the broader project of liberal political thought.
To be sure, the court can achieve legitimacy only if its umpires are per-
ceived to pursue, and indeed do pursue, truth and justice. But the
umpires are – just like the parties and their partisan advocates – only
a part of the system, and the point of view of the umpire is, therefore,
decidedly not the point of view of the system writ large. This observation,
which is obvious with respect to advocates, comes less readily to mind with
respect to umpires. But it is no less certainly, clearly, or, indeed, necess-
arily correct. And once it is in place, the insight reveals the conflation
behind Woolley’s charge that I exaggerate lawyerly partisanship and,
along the way, invent the lawyerly vices. Lawyers are, indeed, officers of
the court, but they are precisely this: officers of the court and not of
the umpire (recall Woolley’s characterizing the lawyer’s duties in this con-
nection in terms of ‘maintaining the process of the adversarial system’).
Woolley’s claim that the lawyerly vices are exaggerated, by contrast,
7 See Woolley, supra note 2 at 992.
8 See Markovits, supra note 1 at 171–211.
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conflates the court with the umpire – a conflation that is, perhaps, more
natural than conflating the court with the advocate but not any less
mistaken.
Accordingly, the advocate’s general duties to support the court merely
entail that the advocate not undermine the court’s legitimacy. This does
(as the doctrinal sections of A Modern Legal Ethics elaborate in consider-
able detail) require that lawyers not undermine the umpire’s impartiality.
But it does not require, or indeed permit, the advocate to adopt the
umpire’s impartial role and abandon her own partisan one. And the posi-
tive law’s constraints on advocates’ partisanship, therefore, cannot, as a
general matter, possibly make the advocate a direct seeker of truth and
justice. This is what I meant, in the book, when I said that the genetic
structure of adversary advocacy, which arises in the shadow of the struc-
tural division of labour between advocate and tribunal, requires advocates
to display the lawerly vices. The book’s close interpretive engagement
with the positive law serves merely to illuminate this general point by dis-
playing it vividly in a particular context. The point, however, stands on its
own, as a necessary truth about adversary lawyering.
III Seeing the world from one’s own point of view
This structural analysis of adjudication and of the advocate’s and the
umpire’s respective roles within the adjudicative process emphasizes
that no part of the process contains, or can assume, the perspective of
the whole. This incompleteness – one might even say partiality – is a
necessary consequence of seeking legitimacy in the face of deep and
entrenched pluralism. There are simply no regulative principles – not
at any level of abstraction – on which all sides of moral and political dis-
putes can agree. Instead, there is only a process with the property that all
who participate in it come to accept its results and in a manner that is
stable in the face of the critical capacities that the participants do or
can come to apply to question the process’s legitimacy. Finally, even
here, the process generates universal acceptance of its results without
generating a complete or comprehensive shared perspective from
which the results are accepted. Rather, every participant comes to the
results from her own perspective, and the several participants’ perspec-
tives merge (or, indeed, converge) only on the narrow question concern-
ing the process’s legitimacy.
This deep and entrenched pluralism is often called, for example, by
Rawls, a ‘fact.’9 But such a characterization risks generating confusion,
because it is important to see that the fact has an explanation, and that
9 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) at xvii.
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the explanation is moral and not epistemic. That is to say, people disagree
about practical matters not simply because questions of allocation and
justice are so difficult that (universal) error is inevitable but also
because, even if the impartial truth were knowable, people could not,
as I explain in the third part of A Modern Legal Ethics, adopt it to regulate
their lives. This thought raises the second point of difference between
Woolley’s approach to legal ethics and mine.
Woolley’s suggestion that, insofar as the lawyer’s role is impartially jus-
tified (perhaps on the grounds that Dare proposes or perhaps on others),
then the actions that this role requires do not contravene ordinary first-
personal morality10 goes wrong in respect of the fact of pluralism. As I
explain in Part Two of A Modern Legal Ethics (the part devoted to the
idea of integrity),11 persons’ deliberative and motivational capacities
render them incapable of adopting the pursuit of impartial morality as
a first-personal ambition. It is not simply that persons do not as it
happens make impartiality their first-personal concern. Rather, it is that
they could not possibly do so – that every first-personal moral ideal,
even if it is formed in response to impartial concerns – will necessarily
be only limited and idiosyncratic with respect to impartiality and there-
fore will necessarily come, at some point, into conflict with impartiality.
Woolley claims that ordinary morality does not apply directly to the
lawyer’s lying and cheating but rather only to this conduct as it is
mediated by ‘the lawyer’s institutional role in a democratic system of
laws’12 and that when morality’s application is mediated in this way, ‘its
conclusion is that what lawyers do is good, not bad.’13 But, in making
this claim, Woolley flatly ignores the central point of my account of integ-
rity, namely that ordinary morality simply cannot apply in this infinitely
flexible way – no person can ever do what Woolley supposes, which is
to make it her first-personal ambition to do whatever is impartially justi-
fied. Instead, all persons’ first-personal ambitions will necessarily some-
times conflict with what impartiality requires: lawyers are not
qualitatively but only quantitatively special, in this connection. They are
special only in that impartiality, when it is applied to their place in the
structures of dispute resolution favoured by modern, egalitarian societies,
requires them to contravene ordinary first-personal moral ambitions in
particularly stark ways – to lie and to cheat, as I say. They are also
special (now, not morally but rather epistemically) in that the formal
and highly articulate character of their professional ethics leaves an elab-
orate paper trail of the conflict.
10 See Woolley, supra note 2 at 995.
11 See Markovits, supra note 1 at 103–54.
12 See Woolley, supra note 2 at 995.
13 See Woolley, supra note 2 at 995.
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Indeed, Bernard Williams’s famous ‘one thought too many’ case,14
which Woolley invokes in support of an alternative to my development
of the ethical tensions inherent in adversary lawyering,15 in fact illustrates
precisely my claim. The wife, in Williams’s example, wants the husband to
save her, not because it is impartially justified to save one’s wife, but rather
simply because she is his wife. She wants, that is, a husband who loves her
idiosyncratically and not impartially. One consequence of my argument is
that the husband could not love his wife – because he could not do any-
thing – in any other way. Indeed, even if he thinks himself to pursue
impartiality, he pursues it idiosyncratically rather than impartially. (This
idea may itself be illustrated by judges’ ethics, incidentally, as when
judges’ commitments to certain kinds of neutrality in fact constitute a
kind of idiosyncratic uprightness that prevents them from acting in
non-neutral ways even when impartiality properly understood requires
it. An example is the judicial enforcement of fugitive slave laws, famously
considered in Robert Cover’s Justice Accused,16 on the grounds of their
neutral authority and in the face of their actual and discriminatory
immorality.)
IV The importance of authenticity
This brings me briefly to my third point. Woolley insists that it is a mistake
to focus on the question of whether lawyers can lead lives well lived in the
first-personal sense – the sense associated with preserving their integrity
and their self-affirmation of authorship over their own lives – to the
exclusion of the question of whether lawyers’ conduct may be impartially
justified. She suggests that I ‘focus exclusively on the question of whether
the lawyer’s life is well lived’17 and, at the very least, neglect the question
of whether ‘as a constitutional democracy, we would embrace lawyerly . . .
[partisanship] given our moral, constitutional, and legal values.’18
Woolley insists, in other words, that impartial morality must be given a
prominent place in legal ethics overall.
I agree that the impartialist question is important. Indeed, much of
what I say about adversary advocacy and the authority of adjudication
in Part Three of the book is, in fact, an effort to take up the impartialist
question in a new way. I seek, in those pages, to cut through the tangle of
considerations that has made the effort to connect partisan lawyering
to the pursuit of justice both theoretically and practically unsatisfying.
14 Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) at 18.
15 See Woolley, supra note 2 at 995.
16 Robert Cover, Justice Accused (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984).
17 See Woolley, supra note 2 at 995.
18 See Woolley, supra note 2 at 999.
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I depart from this tradition to observe that the real point of lawyerly
partisanship is not to achieve justice but to sustain legitimacy. This is
no mere afterthought in the argument of the book or philosopher’s
parlour trick. Rather, my emphasis on legitimacy has practical conse-
quences, which I identify but do not pursue in A Modern Legal Ethics
and which merit further study. One important issue concerns the distri-
bution of legal services:19 where conventional justice-based accounts of
lawyering suggest that unequal access to lawyers might be counteracted
by reducing lawyerly partisanship (and hence rendering advantages in
representation less effective), the legitimacy-based account that
I develop entails that there can be no substitute for providing partisan
counsel to all. Another important question concerns the ethics of govern-
ment lawyers:20 insofar as lawyers’ partisanship is justified by the need to
sustain the legitimate authority of courts, the grounds of adversary advo-
cacy do not extend to government lawyers; the government, after all, does
not need to have the authority of courts legitimated, as it is in authority.
This suggests that the ethics of government lawyering must stand on a sep-
arate footing from ordinary legal ethics (not just for the special case of
criminal prosecutors, but quite generally) and, likely, that the positive
law regulating government lawyers should depart much more from the
rest of the law of lawyering than is commonly recognized.
At the same time, I insist that questions concerning first-personal mor-
ality are no mere afterthought. Impartialist justification is never enough
for an agent’s ethical life. And accordingly, insisting on integrity, authen-
ticity, and similar ethics ideas, even at some cost to impartiality, is not
mere self-indulgence or navel-gazing. It is, instead, a practical necessity
for human persons and an entirely appropriate concern for a profession
whose place in the moral division of labour renders conflicts between
professional obligations and ordinary moral ambitions particularly clear
and stark.
Legal ethics, thus, cannot – for reasons that apply to ethics quite gen-
erally – ever be reduced to generic moral or political theory. And in this
sense, taking the lawyer’s point of view in legal ethics is not a sop to local
interest but an inevitable part of any serious engagement with the legal
facts and moral circumstances of the lawyer’s life.
19 See Markovits, supra note 1 at 201.
20 See Markovits, supra note 1 173 (2008).
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